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1 Introduction
The purpose of company law is to increase social prosperity by raising the welfare
of shareholders, employees, creditors, and other related third parties (Hansmann
et al. 2009). Hence, legal orders regarding commercial companies are constructed to
provide effective, express and easy company formation. Law makers on the other
hand, have acted unconsciously towards a certain company type, namely the single
member company (SMC), which was considered as being against legal theory in
terms of contract formation in general and the company concept in particular. SMC
can be defined as a limited liability company, which has a sole shareholder. SMCs
can be classified into two groups. The first one is formed with a sole shareholder and
the second one is the de facto SMCs which have only one real investor and one or
more shareholders as nominal investors in order to meet a statutory requirement.
Criticisms regarding SMCs went so far that some lawyers have defined the
concept as a ‘‘cancer of economic life’’ (Berg 1974: 935).1 Even though lawyers
ignored the concept of SMC, economic needs in business gave rise to de facto
solutions and the de facto SMCs became an indispensable and inevitable part of
business activities in practice. Eventually, economic reality forced lawmakers to
accept and regulate SMCs.
Most European jurisdictions have accepted the concept of SMCs as a legal entity
and the European Union (EU) has adopted a directive specifically regulating SMCs.
Accordingly, as an EU candidate country, Turkey harmonized its Turkish
Commercial Code (TCC) in 2012 in accordance with EU regulations and introduced
SMCs for the first time to the Turkish commercial law landscape. This article takes
the SMC regulation in Turkey as its focal point and evaluates its impact in a
comparative analysis looking at different jurisdictions and its economic effects after
the enactment of the new TCC in 2012. In view of the fact that SMCs can only be
formed as limited liability companies in Turkish law, this paper first examines the
limited liability principle in commercial companies and sole proprietorship in the
frame of the firm theory. After defining the principle of limited liability and its
benefits for entrepreneurs, this article then evaluates SMC regulation in European
jurisdictions and demonstrates the risks and benefits of the concept. Second, this
article makes a comparative analysis between provisions of the new TCC and the
EU directive demonstrating also the principles to avoid misuse and risk external-
ization in SMCs. The final section of this article examines data and statistics
regarding commercial companies established in 2012 and 2013 and evaluates the
economic impact of the new TCC regulation.
As all corporations, SMCs have the aim and effect of economizing transaction
costs. Therefore, the purpose of this article is to demonstrate the transaction cost
economy of SMCs in the light of the new provisions of TCC.
1 Main concerns of lawyers about SMCs were the organ formation and operation of company abuse. See
Tekinalp (2013).
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2 The concept of limited liability
2.1 Limited liability in commercial activities
One of the best forms of establishing a business for an entrepreneur is to build a
limited liability company, since it enables the entrepreneur to invest a small amount
of equity and reduce risk through diversification2 and liquidate his investment
quickly (Posner 2008). Moreover, conducting a business through a company allows
entrepreneurs to transact easily through the medium of a corporate entity and thus
lower the cost of business contracting (Halpern et al. 1980; Hansmann et al. 2009).
The concept of ‘‘limited liability’’ is necessity for entrepreneurs who desire to
establish business through a company where they can be isolated from some of the
risks of their commercial activity.3 Therefore, limited liability, as a valuable
financing device, a contracting tool and universally accepted feature in terms of
company formation should be defined and the reasons of choosing this concept
should be explained at the outset.
Limited liability is defined as ‘‘defensive asset partitioning to distinguish it from
the affirmative partitioning effects of the legal personality’’ (Hansmann et al. 2009:
385). When a company is incorporated with limited liability, shareholders commonly
risk no more than their initial investment. In other words, if a company is
incorporated with limited liability, the assets of the company provide guarantee to the
company’s creditors regarding the company’s debts on the other hand, shareholders’
personal assets are pledged as security to his personal creditors (Hansmann et al.
2009). As a result, when a company defaults on its obligations, the creditors can only
claim the company’s assets, but not the shareholders’ personal assets. This does not
necessarily mean that limited liability eliminates the risks of commercial activity
failure, but shifting them from individual shareholders to creditors4 but this risk
shifting comes at the price of a higher interest rate compared to an individual
merchant, who is liable with all his personal assets. Therefore, this risk is internalized
through high interest rates and as a result higher costs at the expense of shareholders,
not at the expense of creditors. One may ask why would a shareholder wants to shift
the downside risk of commercial activity failure to creditor, given that shareholder
2 Since the investors invest their assets in a single firm, diversification is not a crucial consideration for
closely held firms. For further information see Ribstein (1991).
3 In American law debt investors in sole proprietorship, general and limited partnerships, business trusts
and other ventures possess limited liability. See Easterbrook and Fischel (1996). On the other hand, in
Turkish law only the commercial companies can be subject to limited liability.
4 There are two kinds of creditors: voluntary and involuntary. Voluntary creditors are consumers,
employees, trade creditors and lenders (Easterbrook and Fischel 1996). Involuntary creditors can be
considered as tort victims and tax and regulatory authorities. Posner (2008), states that voluntary creditors
are fully compensated by high interest rates, as a result of estimation of company default risk when the
loan agreement signed. Defenders of the limited liability concept state that uncompensated transfers of
risk of business failure from shareholders to creditors would occur on a substantial scale. Therefore, this
would presumably restrict the availability of credit to limited liability companies and reduce the level of
economic activity accordingly. For the historical evaluations and doctrinal discussions regarding limited
liability see Halpern et al. (1980). Despite the assertions made by the defenders, consensus has been
reached on the fact that limited liability aggregates the level of economic activity.
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must compensate creditor for bearing any additional risk (Posner 2008). There are
some possible answers for this.5 On the one hand, the creditor could be a bank which
is a specialist in the risk appraisal; therefore they are in a much better position to
assess risk than a shareholder. In this case, it would be cheaper for a bank to appraise
the risk. On the other hand, shareholders can be more risk averse than a bank when
the corporate character of the banks are considered.6 Stated characteristics of limited
liability, the complex nature of a modern economy and the risk accession increases
the need for a limited liability regime. As a result, the reasons of highly utilizing
limited liability can be evaluated in the light of the firm theory7 as follows:
First, agent monitoring increases the costs of companies. Agent is defined as ‘‘a
director or an officer or any person who is related to the corporation or who has
directly or indirectly de facto control of the corporation8’’ (Halpern et al. 1980:
123). Limited liability decreases the need to monitor agents, since it makes
diversification and passivity a more rational strategy, it decreases the cost of
operating the company (Easterbrook and Fischel 1996).
Second, limited liability decreases the cost ofmonitoringother shareholders (Halpern
et al. 1980). In the case of unlimited liability, members of the company should control
the other members’ wealth since they are fully and severally liable for the company’s
debts. Therefore, members of an unlimited liability company should engage in costly
monitoring of other members in order to avoid the risk of other member’s asset transfer,
which would risk his assets. However in limited liability, the identities of the
shareholders are unrelated thus, it avoids all these costs (Easterbrook and Fischel 1996).
Third, a limited liability company’s shareholders can freely transfer their shares.
This is a crucial fact for the market in controlling the company, which serves an
important purpose for a company’s functioning9 (Manne 1967).When a company is run
poorly, shareholders have the opportunity to sell their shares to a new group of investors
who can install a new managerial team—since shares are tied to votes. To avoid
possible future displacement, managers in a limited liability company would operate
effectively to keep share prices high10 (Easterbrook and Fischel 1996). Undoubtedly,
this evaluation can also be done for the publicly traded limited liability companies.
5 For all possible answers stated in this article see Posner (2008).
6 One should never overestimate the fact that, under some conditions, large shareholder might monitor
the risk of company default better than a small trade creditor. The trade creditor on the other hand can
protect himself by limiting the extension of credit to a short period (Posner 2008). These general
characterizations of shareholders and corporate creditors are not universally true especially when
unsophisticated creditors and employees who hold no diversified portfolios are likely to be more risk
adverse and less able to appraise business risks than institutional shareholders. See Ribstein (1991: 101
fn. 92).
7 The reasons why economic activities should be carried out in firms rather than individuals are
illustrated in firm theory. For one of the first articles on this theory see Coase (1937).
8 Three kinds of conflicts, conflicts between managers and shareholders, conflicts among shareholders
and company’s other constituencies are called by economists as agency problems (Hansmann et al. 2009).
9 It is important to mention that, market for corporate control performs better for publicly held private
companies.
10 It should be stated that, unlike unlimited liability company, in limited liability shares are fungible and
each share has its fixed market price. Therefore, there is no risk of being surcharged for an investor who
wants to purchase shares.
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Fourth, limited liability allows isolating different kinds of businesses at the time
of obtaining credit (Hansmann et al. 2009). By forming different kinds of companies
as subsidiaries, each limited liability company would have different assets.
Therefore, independent assets in a company group would be pledged as collateral
security to creditors.
Fifth, limited liability shields the company from creditors of the owners. These
creditors have access to the shares of an owner, but not to the assets of the company
(Easterbrook and Fischel 1996). This is a decisive advantage over a partnership,
which is always at risk that a creditor of a partner could seize assets of a company
and threatens the business.
Finally, limited liability enables risk and return between equity holders and debt
holders to be allocated in a more flexible manner, transaction costs of collection in
case of insolvency are reduced and the pricing of stock are simplified. This
significantly stabilizes the conduct of business in a company with limited liability
(Hansmann et al. 2009).
Another way of doing business with the principle of limited liability is the sole
proprietorship. This concept emerged as an alternative to SMCs and is considered to
be an ideal model which satisfies the needs of entrepreneurs. However, it turned out
to be an inefficient model for business activities. Indeed, an entrepreneur who wants
to form a sole proprietorship with limited liability would associate his business
assets into a separate pool in which he grants his business creditors priority over his
personal creditors with respect to their claims (Hansmann and Kraakman 2000).
Performing business with a limited liability company on the other hand allows asset
separation by the help of existing legal rules. Nevertheless in the case of sole
proprietorship, new legal rules should be enacted which are considered to be costly
and time consuming in terms of law making procedure (Aydoğan 2012). Moreover,
sole proprietorship conflicts with the legal principles that business enterprises have
no legal entity and separate assets, and therefore owners are liable with their entire
assets towards creditors. Creditors have an equal priority upon the entire assets of
debtor and cannot simply change this rule by putting terms into contracts
(Hansmann and Kraakman 2000). Yet, it is in the lawmaker’s discretion to regulate
sole proprietorship with separate assets (Aydoğan 2012).
2.2 Single member companies as limited liability companies
2.2.1 SMCs in European jurisdictions
Although the regulations regarding SMCs are recently introduced in some
jurisdictions, de facto SMCs forms have been used for almost a century in USA,
Europe and Turkey as a result of economic rationalism (Tekinalp 2013). In other
words, economic necessities have forced jurisdictions to accept SMCs as a valid and
legal entity. European jurisdictions can be considered as pioneers of the use of
SMCs. Especially England and Lichtenstein have vital importance in the History of
SMCs. Indeed, Solomon v. Solomon & Co.11 is the leading case in which de facto
11 [1897] A.C. 22, H.L. See Davies (2012).
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SMCs were acknowledged in England (Davies 2012). In this decision House of
Lords allowed incorporation of a company with a single member, although the Joint
Stock Companies Act 1856 required the companies with limited liability to have at
least seven members.
Today, legal provisions regulating SMCs in England have been enacted in
Section 7 of the Companies Act 2006, which allows the formation of any company
with a single person. Moreover, Lichtenstein is the first country where SMCs were
explicitly allowed by the civil code of 1925. Many other jurisdictions did not
regulate the formation of SMCs, but accepted SMCs emerged through concentration
of all shares by a single shareholder. De facto SMCs existed in Germany in pre-war
time (in the 1920s). The same was true for Polish law in the pre-war time. Over the
years, the use of SMCs was expanded and legal systems were obliged to respond to
the economic realities of SMCs. In this respect, Germany made one of the first
radical reforms in the Limited Liability Company Act (GmbHG) in 1980 and
allowed the formation of the SMC. According to the statistical analysis on the
application of SMCs made in 1980- before the legal reform- 25 % of the limited
liability companies in Germany were established as de facto SMCs (Kreuzer 1980).
This ratio however increased after the legal reform. It is stated that approximately
50 % of one million limited liability companies in Germany are established as
SMCs (Peifer 2008). In Europe, France followed Germany in 1985 and enacted
SMCs in its Code Civil.12 The Netherlands (1986) and Belgium (1987) are the other
European countries that allowed the formation of SMC. On the other hand, SMCs
were not recognized in Spain, Greece, Ireland, the UK and Portugal prior to the
directive (Werlauff 2003).
After EU member states started to accept the concept of SMCs in their
jurisdictions, EU adopted the Twelve Company Law Directive13 in order to
harmonize the use of single member private limited liability companies in the
national laws of member states. The main goal of the directive is to create a legal
instrument to enable individual entrepreneurs to limit their liability.14
The goals of setting up a SMC can be classified into three categories (Jocic
2005). First, to encourage small and medium size enterprises (SME) to be able form
a SMC (Edwards 1998). According to the Commission, 94.4 % of the micro-
enterprises in the EU employ less than ten people and micro enterprises have larger
contribution to employment than large businesses.15 In this regard, SMEs are the
most appropriate form for SMCs.16 Second, to provide companies right of freedom
in their establishment (Jocic 2005). Third, to disperse the assets of sole shareholder
and the company (Power 1990).
12 For a detailed evaluation of French regulation of SMCs see Çevik (1998).
13 Twelfth Council Company Law Directive on Single Member Private Limited Liability Companies
89/667/EEC of 21 December 1989, Official Journal (OJ) L 395, 30.12.1989; This directive is changed by
Directive 2009/102/EC of 16 September 2009, OJ L 258/20, 1.10.2009.
14 For a detailed study on the Directive see Çelik (2007).
15 White paper on growth, competitiveness and employment: The challenges and ways forward into the
21st century COM (94) 207 Final and COM (93) 700 Final.
16 See footnote 15.
30 Eur J Law Econ (2016) 42:25–43
123
According to the 2nd article of the directive, formation of a SMC is defined as:
(1) A company may have a sole member when it is formed and also when all
its shares come to be held by a single person (single-member company).
Second paragraph of the same article states that: (2) Member States may,
pending coordination of national laws relating to groups, lay down special
provisions or sanctions for cases where: (a) a natural person is the sole
member of several companies; (b) a single-member company or any other
legal person is the sole member of a company.
Only private limited liability companies are intended to be covered by the
directive. In article 6 of directive, it is recognized that member states could regulate
single member public limited liability companies as well. If a member company
regulates single member public limited liability companies then the provisions of
the directive would apply. Moreover, the directive not only allows the formation of
a single member private limited liability companies, but also permits member states
to legislate limited liable individual entrepreneurs in article 7. This article is later
named as lex Portugal, since Portugal was the only EU member state, which
regulated the limited liability of the individual entrepreneur (E.I.R.L). Many
economists and practitioners (Schwarz 2000) viewed the E.I.R.L as a poor
application of limited liability regulation, and in 1997, Portugal eventually accepted
the formation of single member private limited liability company without outright
abolishing the E.I.R.L.
The targeted harmonization could not be achieved by the directive since it gave
too much discretion to the member states (Jocic 2005; Eroğlu 2008). Indeed, the
directive does not address very important issues, such as creditors’ protection,
minimum capital requirements, transfer of seat, registration requirements and
dissolution and left them to the regulation at a national level.17 On the other hand,
the directive at least allows all member states to regulate SMCs.
After the regulation of EU Twelfth Directive, SMEs started to play even more
important role in strengthening the EU economy. The Commission’s annual report
on SMEs estimates that in 2012 there were around 20,7 million SMEs in the EU.
This constitutes more than 98 % of all enterprises. SMEs accounted for 67 % of
total EU employment and for 58 % of EU gross value added.18
On the other hand, due to the diversity of national company laws, establishing a
subsidiary abroad involves costs of meeting legal and administrative requirements,
for instance, necessary legal advice and translation costs in other countries, which
are frequently different in companies’ home country. Those costs are likely to be
particularly high for groups of companies since any SME parent company is faced
17 European Commission, Roadmap, Single member Company, DG MARKT/F2, 03/2013, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/smartregulation/impact/planned_ia/docs/2014_markt_003_single_member_company.
pdf (accessed on 15 October 2014).
18 The report ‘‘EU SMEs in 2012: at the crossroads. Annual report on small and medium-sized
enterprises in the EU’’, 2011/12, available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/facts-figures-
analysis/performance-review/files/supporting-documents/2012/annual-report_en.pdf. (accessed on 23
January 2015).
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with different requirements for each subsidiary it tries to establish in another
Member State.19
According the consultation on SMCs in the 2013, 74 % of companies and
business federations considered that the harmonization of rules for single-member
private limited liability companies could facilitate cross-border activities of
SMEs.20 Consequently, the European Commission drafted the proposal for
Directive on Single Member Limited Liability Companies, which leads member
states to harmonize their national laws accordingly.
The new proposal simplifies the single member limited liability company
formation by allowing on-line registration (Art. 14) with a uniform template of
articles of association in all member states (Art. 11), reducing the minimum capital
requirement to € 1 (Art. 16) accompanied by balance sheet solvency statement and
regulating director’s liability21 (Art. 22). These provisions of proposal would
diminish set-up and operational costs. According to the estimates stated in the
impact assessment,22 the cost reduction for the founders of single-member private
limited liability companies in 1 year in the EU could range from €236 to 653
million.
Moreover, creditors are strictly protected by the restrictions on the distributions,
and all SM private limited liability companies have to use the EU—wide
abbreviation in their trade name SUP (Societas Unius Personae), which would
secure the transactions between company and the third parties by increasing the
awareness of third parties on the company type.
Although on-line registration system would increase the costs for the EU member
states, it is stated in the impact assessment that, costs would be one-off versus the
resulting permanent benefits for companies.23
2.2.2 Benefits of SMCs
Prior to its acceptance in most of the jurisdictions, de facto SMCs were established
in order to benefit from the economic advantages of this company type. In Turkey,
to comply with the statutory requirements on the minimum number of shareholders,
most investors formed de facto SMCs through their family members.24 However, as
a result of conflicts among family members given the lack of professionalism and
governance, such companies did not last long. Therefore, acceptance of SMCs as a
legal entity legitimizes the existence of de facto SMCs and helped to make the life
of the companies longer (Eroğlu 2008).
SMCs generate potential monitoring economies for the firm owners.25 In a SMC
form, the shareholder does not need to select fellow shareholders having similar
19 European Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assesment, COM (2014) 212.
20 COM (2014) 212.
21 For an analysis of director’s liability in listed firms using modern finance theory see Rose (2011).
22 See COM (2014) 212.
23 COM (2014) 212.
24 For ownership characteristics of different countries see Marinov and Heiman (1998).
25 For limited liability companies see Hansmann and Kraakman (2000).
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assets and risk preferences. Therefore, the single shareholder will not face
negotiating costs (Hansmann and Kraakman 2000). Since he would not have to
investigate the other possible future shareholders and face negotiating costs, his
information costs would be reduced. For that reason, SMCs serve as a great
instrument for institutions such as universities, foundations, societies, state owned
enterprises, which need to establish a company in order to provide a fund to
accomplish their purpose. For example, a university or a foundation can form a
limited liability company and transfer revenues of the company to the university or
foundation budget to provide qualified education for a university or satisfy the goal
of the foundation. However, formation of limited liability companies by these
institutions with multiple shareholders might conflict with their characteristics and
the interest that they represent (Lindemann 1996; Eisenhardt 2003; Tekinalp 2007;
Aydoğan 2012). Therefore, the best way to supply funds to these institutions with
reduced information and negotiating costs is with the establishment of SMCs.
Similarly, the globalized economy in the world forces countries to have well-
functioning and competitive commercial laws in order to compete with other
countries in order to attract foreign direct investment and encourage entrepreneurs
to participate in business (Eroğlu 2008). SMCs are one of the best ways for a foreign
investor who requires entering individually into a new market in which he does not
know the market conditions and legal rules of the country. A foreign investor would
not have to search for a partner in the country with unknown market conditions or in
the cases where he finds the right partner, he does not have to bargain for the
partner’s contribution to the firm.
SMCs provide a great advantage not only for foreign investors, but also for sole
entrepreneurs who want to enter into the market alone, but intend to go public after
a certain period of time. Since there is an existing company, without investing on
the formation of another new company and reducing transaction costs, single
member public limited liability companies can easily go public by offering its
shares (Tekinalp 2013), which increases the efficiency of the market.
Due to their corporate character, SMCs allow the transfer of all company assets
in a single legal transaction, which decreases transaction costs (Tekinalp 2007). In
most of the continental European law jurisdictions, in the cases of mergers,
divisions and acquisitions, assets of the company (multiple or single member) are
transferred to another company with a single contract, which is registered to the
trade registry. In other words, there is no need to apply the form requirement to
transfer the rights on each item in the company assets which increases the efficiency
in the establishment procedure by reducing the costs of registration and announce-
ment in a trade registry.
Moreover, SMCs are the practical form for affiliated companies (Atabek 1987;
Wooldridge 2001). For example, a company in the oil sector can establish three
different SMCs for oil production, manufacturing and marketing respectively
(Aydoğan 2012). In the case of a default, each company would be liable for the
company debts with its own assets. Since SMCs prevent potential conflicts, such as
protection of minority shareholders in the company group structure and this
increases the business efficiency, SMCs are the essential instruments in the
formation of 100 % owned **subsidiaries (Forstmoser et al. 1996).
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It is important to note that the relation between efficiency and size of the firm is
one of the most serious problems of firm theory. Single shareholder reduces the
governance costs by decreasing decision-making, hierarchy cost of the firm.26 This
fact is crucial when the sole shareholder and the sole board member are the same
natural or legal person. It does not only facilitate the terms of decision making, but
also reduces the agency costs since conflicts between managers and shareholders
and conflicts among shareholders can not arise. Moreover, separation of ownership
and control principle accepted in limited liability doctrine creates asymmetric
information problem, which results in the shareholders lack of knowledge regarding
the management for the firm. However, the SMCs asymmetric information problem
does not occur when the sole owner and sole manager are the same persons.
Considering the benefits of SMCs, it is important to regulate it as a legal entity to
increase rates of development in national economies by allowing the formation of
more firms.27 However, they might carry some risks for the shareholder and the
creditors.
2.2.3 Risks of SMCs
Despite the many advantages of SMCs, they also carry potential risks, which could
lead to an abuse of creditor’s rights. There is a possibility that a sole member’s
assets and the assets of the company gets mixed up, which could end up shifting the
shareholder’s debts to the SMC. Moreover, since there is only one shareholder for
the supervision and observation of the organs and managers of SMCs, in case of an
infringement, the cost of occurred damage might increase (Tekinalp 2013).
The information costs are high in unlimited liability companies, because of the
liability of the company members. Creditors need to monitor the members’ assets
and members also monitor themselves. However, in small and closely held limited
liability companies, such as SMCs, the difference in information costs between
limited and unlimited liability firms might be small due the fact that their creditors
often require personal guaranties, which sometimes increases the transaction costs
(Halpern et al. 1980). In order to protect their investment, creditors might be willing
to be informed of any changes in the firm and this can only be done in monitoring
activities (Halpern et al. 1980).
One of the risks that small firms, such as SMCs, bear is that incorporation of
limited liability sometimes cannot allocate risk that in the long run weakens the firm
and favors the creditors (Freedman 2000). Furthermore, under certain circumstances
limited liability cannot reduce the transaction and monitoring costs. In some
respects, the apparent existence of limited liability adds costs, such as cost of
disclosure28 (Freedman 2000).
26 Regarding the cost of bureaucracy see Williamson (1985).
27 According to Williamson (1985: 154) the major benefit of integration derives from the fact that party
with the authority in a firm can resolve disputes without litigation but by decision making. It is quite
difficult to agree with this statement from a legal point of view since in some cases decision making
would not be easy even though the majority principle is accepted. Moreover directors carry the burden of
personal liability because of the decisions they have made.
28 For mandatory accounting disclosure by small private companies see Arrunada (2011).
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Although SMCs engender risks in their functioning, the cost and benefit analysis
demonstrates that their benefits prevail over risks considering the fact that risks can
be precluded by accepting some safeguards, such as piercing the corporate veil.
2.2.4 Principles regarding SMC and safeguards against misuse and externality
of risks
2.2.4.1 Piercing the corporate veil When the principle of separation of assets is
breached, the sanction of this infringement would be piercing the corporate veil.29
Under some circumstances, the company’s veil is pierced or lifted to abolish limited
liability in favor of creditors. By piercing the corporate veil, creditors can claim
shareholder’s assets in case of a SMC’s—or any type of company—default.
Piercing the corporate veil has no statutory basis in Turkey and corporate veil can be
pierced only in exceptional cases by courts. When a shareholder enjoys the assets of
a company as if the assets belong to him, accepts the credit returns of the company,
yields to bankruptcy of the company and plunges company into debt, in short,
in situations such as this where the company is used for an illegal or improper aim,
the veil may be pierced by the courts (Tekinalp 2013). In most of the jurisdictions
courts give their decisions according to the facts of that particular case.
From the economic point of view, in most of the jurisdictions courts will pierce
the veil when a SMC cannot efficiently improve the liquidity and diversification,
and most probably engages in socially excessive level of risk taking.30 Misrepre-
sentation is the one of the basic basis for the courts to pierce the corporate veil. In
the cases of misrepresentation, creditors cannot foresee the actual default position of
the company and cannot assess the risk of default. Therefore, misrepresentation
would increase the information costs for creditors (Posner 2008).
Courts might be willing to pierce the veil in SMCs more than publicly held
corporations (Easterbrook and Fischel 1996). The reason is that in SMCs, the
management and the risk bearing is less separated. Since in SMCs manager
shareholder’s liability is limited to the company assets, they transfer more risk to the
third parties. Therefore, piercing the corporate veil reduces the costs that third
parties bear.
Most of the piercing the corporate veil cases arise from parent subsidiary
combinations. Parent companies can form subsidiaries to engage in risky activities
with minimum capital. In cases where the company runs well, the parent company
can earn a profit. On the other hand, when a company unsuccessful, the subsidiary
may declare bankruptcy and the parent company may form another subsidiary with
the same managers.31 As Easterbrook and Fischel (1996: 57) states: ‘‘this asymmetry
between benefits and costs, if the limited liability is absolute, would create
29 See Farrar (1990); Payne (1997); Thomson (1990–1991). For Turkish Law see Tekinalp and Tekinalp
1995; Dural 1998; Yanlı 2000; Seven and Göksoy (2006); Suits that are related to Veil Piercing in
Turkish law see Tekinalp (2013).
30 Almost every US cases where veil is pierced, involved a close corporation. See Easterbrook and
Fischel (1996).
31 For the example see Easterbrook and Fischel (1996); see also Posner (2008).
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incentives to engage in a socially excessive amount of risky activities.’’ Therefore,
courts would pierce the corporate veil if such cases occur in corporate groups.
Undercapitalization is an important factor for veil piercing decisions, which rely
on the similar basis. When the capital of a company is low, the probability of risky
activities is higher (Easterbrook and Fischel 1996). In the situation of undercap-
italization, disclosing information about the company’s unusual capitalization to
creditors is crucial. The reason is that sometimes creditors do not investigate the
company’s financial situation, because some transactions are too small in value.
When the company is undercapitalized, piercing the corporate veil threat might
motivate the company to disclose relevant information at the time of the transaction.
Creditors can free to decide on the transaction. In turn, the debtor has to pay for
employing these risky activities (Easterbrook and Fischel 1996).
In Turkish law, there is no specific provision regulating a rule that permits courts
to pierce the corporate veil. Besides the economic basis with respect to the facts of
the case, the general principles of Turkish Civil and Commercial Codes would be
applied **(Tekinalp and Tekinalp 1995; Yanlı 2000). In the case of misuse of the
legal personality, breach of good faith rules would be applied in Turkish Law.32 The
legal cases in which the company’s veil is pierced are rare.33 By acknowledging the
concept of SMCs in the Turkish system, we assume that the number of cases in
which the piercing the corporate veil doctrine is applied will increase.
2.2.4.2 Principle of separation of assets Separation of assets, which is one of the
characteristics of limited liability, avoids the mix up of assets in the company and
acts as a safeguard against the misuse of SMCs. Separation principle provides
absolute separation of the legal personality of the company and the shareholder,
diverges assets and allow the two different personalities being totally separate while
enjoying rights and being subject to obligations (Tekinalp 2007, 2013). Therefore,
creditors of the company cannot claim on shareholder’s assets and shareholder’s
personal creditors nor claim on company’s assets, if there is a lack of legal basis for
the application of piercing the corporate veil doctrine. Since the creditors can only
claim assets of their own debtors, separation of assets principle allocates risk in
SMCs and reduces the transaction costs in the case of bankruptcy.34
2.2.4.3 Principle of prohibition against loans to the shareholders by compa-
nies The prohibition against loans to shareholders by companies reduces the
chance of misuse of SMCs by creating a virtual wall between the assets of company
and assets of shareholders. This principle is regulated in TCC both for public and
private limited liability companies (TCC Art. 358 and 644). Therefore, according to
32 According to Art. 2 of Turkish Civil Code ‘‘every person is bound to exercise his rights and fulfill his
obligations according to the principles of good faith.’’ Therefore judges would decide if there is a misuse
or not accordingly. For the translation of this article see Eroğlu (2008: 1282).
33 For some of the important cases with respect to piercing the corporate veil doctrine in Turkish law see.
Supreme Court 19. HD., 2.11.2000, E. 2000/5828, K. 2000/7383; Supreme Court 19. HD., 15.6.2006 E.
2005/8774, K. 2006/5232; Supreme Court 11. HD, 5.4.2012, E. 2010/14261, K. 2012/5407 available at
http://kazanci.com (accessed on 13.02.2014).
34 For same approach in limited liability principle see Hansmann et al. (2009).
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these provisions shareholders or members of the company may not be indebted to
the company if the shareholder does not fulfill its due obligations arising from
capital payment and the company’s profit, including the free reserves is not
sufficient to recoup the losses from previous years. This principle serves as a great
instrument to avoid misuse in SMCs.
2.2.4.4 Minimum capital requirement Although minimum capital requirement has
some disadvantages such as administrative costs in determining the amount of
capital that firms should raise and cost error in situations where the capital
requirement sat so high that it blocks companies to enter into the market and allows
the existing firms charge monopoly prices (Easterbrook and Fischel 1996), the
minimum capital requirement guarantees the amount of capital of SMCs and can be
considered as a method of internalizing the costs of risk taking.
The minimum capital requirements set forth in TCC for public limited companies
is 50.000 TRL for the equity capital and 100.000 TRL for the authorized capital
according to the Art. 332 of TCC. For the private limited liability companies, the
minimum capital requirement is 10.000 TRL. In some jurisdictions, a system that
provides guarantee for the capital contribution in SMCs is regulated.35 However, in
order to encourage the formation of SMCs that are effective instruments for the
economy and social welfare, additional conditions that restrain the establishment of
SMCs should not be included in the regulations.
3 The regulation of SMCs in Turkish law and its consequences
3.1 Basic provisions of the Turkish Commercial Code
The new TCC that entered into force in July 2012 has reformist provisions mostly
regarding company law. One of the most significant and novel provisions for
Turkish company law is the provision with respect to SMCs. Before the provisions
regulating SMCs were put into force, de facto SMCs existed in practice where most
of the shares were concentrated by one real shareholder the other small amount of
shares were distributed among passive shareholders to comply with the number of
minimum number of shareholder requirement.
SMCs are introduced in the Turkish legal system with the new TCC and the new
TCC allows the establishment of those in the form of either private or public limited
liability companies. Therefore, legal personality and limited liability are the two
basic characteristics of SMCs. TCC Art. 573 allows the establishment of single
member (SM) private limited liability companies and in the reasoning, it is stated
that the provisions of EU Twelfth Directive are mostly taken as a basis during the
drafting of this article. However, it is also pointed out in the reasoning that Art. 573
aimed not only to harmonize national laws with that of EU, but also to prevent the
misuse arising from the de facto SM private limited liability companies.
35 In favor of this system see Eroğlu (2008).
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Art. 338 of TCC details the requirements of SM public limited liability companies
and in the reasoning it is stated that EU Twelfth Directive’s approach towards SMCs
is reflected in this article. Moreover, the article’s reasoning explains the benefits of
SM public limited liability companies and states that they facilitate the formation of
group of companies since they are the best instruments in establishing subsidiaries,
support the governance of companies, simplify the establishment of foundation
enterprises, and prevent the family companies from dissolution.
The first paragraph of Art. 338 of TCC prescribes SMCs that are formed ab initio
with one member. The second paragraph, however, regulates the SMCs that are not
initially constituted with one member, but became SMC by virtue of all of the shares
being vested in one shareholder. The second paragraph also states the publicity
requirement, which states the fact that board of directors need to be notified in
writing, in 7 days after transactions that vest shares in one shareholder. Further-
more, after the board of directors receives the written notification, they are entitled
to register the fact that the company became a SMC in the Turkish Trade Registry
and announce this fact in the Turkish Trade Registry Gazette within 7 days. Similar
requirement regulated for SM private limited liability companies in Art. 573/2 TCC
which is a parallel provision to the Art. 3 of the Directive.
A natural or a legal person could form either a public and private SMC (Art. 338
and 553). On the other hand, TCC has no parallel provision to Directive Art. 2,
which reserves a member state a right to lay down special provisions or sanctions
against natural persons who are the sole member of a company. The only restriction
is that the company cannot acquire its shares in a way that the acquisition grants him
the status of sole shareholder.
Regarding decision taking, TCC Art. 408/3 and 616/3 provide specific provisions
related to this subject. According to these provisions, a sole shareholder in either
public or private limited liability companies is authorized to take decisions for the
company. In other words, shareholder exercises the powers of general meeting of
the SMCs. These decisions should be drawn up in writing and comply with the Art.
5 of the Directive.
With respect to transactions between the member and the company, the written
requirement is stated in the 5th Art. of the Directive and also in TCC Art. 629/2 and
371/6 for SM public and private limited liability companies respectively. According
to the provisions of the TCC, contracts between a sole member and his company, as
either represented by him or not, would be drawn up in writing. These provisions do
not apply to contracts that are deemed to be unimportant and ordinary according to
the market conditions. Although Art. 5 of the Directive and TCC resemble each
other, the TCC has regulated the written requirement rule in an extended scope
(Çelik 2007). First, according to the provision of TCC, a sole member does not
necessarily represent the company for the written requirement. Second, this
requirement is a form of contract validity.
It should be indicated that, third parties would have been more effectively
protected if a provision which imposes an obligation to state ‘‘SM’’ in the trade
name and company documents were regulated in the TCC (Çelik 2007). Moreover,
sole shareholder’s liability is not specifically regulated in Turkish law and as a result
disputes may arise especially when the sole shareholder also acts as a company
38 Eur J Law Econ (2016) 42:25–43
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manager. A possible resolution might be the application of general provisions
regarding the manager liability under the TCC.
The European Commission’s proposal provides solutions to the criticisms that
are indicated above by regulating the obligation to indicate the abbreviation SUP in
the trade name and the liability of directors and single members of SMC. As a
candidate country to the EU, Turkey should harmonize its legislation according to
the provisions of the proposal after it is put into force as a directive internally.
However, the harmonization process will be introducing costs for the Turkish
economy regarding on-line registration process, since infrastructure of digital
registration system has not been established in Turkey. The formation of public and
private limited liability companies are accomplished by the registration of articles of
association to the trade registry (TCC Art. 354 and 587). Moreover, changing
provisions of TCC regarding the minimum capital requirement (Art. 332, 580),
which secures the creditors, articles of association (Art. 576 and 339) would
increase the law making cost. However, simplification of SMCs’ formation over all
would increase the effectiveness of the application of this company model.
3.2 Expectations and evaluations
De facto SMCs have been the solution to the economic necessities until the
enactment of the new TCC that allows for the establishment of public and private
limited liability companies as SMCs. TCC entered into force in July 2012 and for
almost 2 years, the provisions of TCC have been applied. An important question can
be raised at this point: what is the outcome of new TCC with respect to limited
liability companies and SMCs?
The new TCC includes reformist provisions regarding public disclosure
requirements particularly for limited liability companies that obviously reduce
transaction costs. According to Art. 1527 of TCC, public limited liability companies
which are subject to independent audit should develop a website and put up all the
relevant documents online that they are under a duty to disclose. In the draft TCC,
this article was regulated differently and all companies with limited liability were
under the obligation to develop a website and publish all documents that they have
in this website. Before the amendment, the article was definitely drafted to reduce
information costs and was in compliance with the European regulations.
Moreover, the new TCC increases the relevant documents or events that are to be
registered in the trade registry. Indeed, this accretion will increase the administra-
tive costs for companies and make the establishment of companies more difficult.
However, the statistics below shows the apparent results to be positive with respect
to the Turkish economy in general and the company formation in particular.
In the third quarter of 2013, theGrossDomestic Product in current priceswas 619,303
million USD and in constant prices 91,219 million TRL. Moreover, the Turkish
economy grew by 4.4 % expanding by 4.0 % in the first three quarters of 2013.36
36 Report on Turkish Economy, Ministry of Customs and Trade, 13 February 2014, Available at http://
risk.gtb.gov.tr/data/52c2bb03487c8e312c013182/T%C3%9CRK%C4%B0YE%20EKONOM%C4%
B0S%C4%B0%20G%C3%96STERGELER%C4%B0_2014_02_13.pdf (accessed on 13.02.2014).
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Most importantly, foreign direct investment in the third quarter of 2013 reached
7409 million dollars in Turkey. According to the statistics of Turkish Ministry of
Customs and Trade 2013,37 3.875 public and private limited liability companies
were established with foreign capital. Foreign investors preferred public limited
liability companies rather than private. Indeed the number of public companies with
foreign capital was 496 and the number increased to 801 in 2013.
Moreover, in 2013, the number of active commercial companies increased by
3.46 % and reached to 972.491. The 81.5 % of which were private limited
companies and 11 % public limited liability companies.
It is noteworthy to mention that in 2012 when the former TCC was in force, the
number of established companies was 39.764, however, in 2013, this number
increased 25.6 % to 49.943 and the number of public limited liability company
increased by 111.4 % which is drastic (Table 1).38
Table 1 Company establishments according to company types in 2013













Number 6.951 35 2 33.097 791 40.877
Equity Capital
(million TL)
5880.9 4.5 0.1 3826.1 – 9711.7
November
Number 892 1 0 3.755 67 4.715
Equity Capital
(million TL)
1354.3 0.02 0 413.1 – 767.4
December
Number 860 0 0 3.435 56 4.351
Equity Capital
(million TL)
836.7 0 0 406.9 – 1243.5
SUM
Number 8.703 36 2 40.287 915 49.943
Capital
(million TL)
8071.9 4.5 0.1 4691.1 – 12,767.6
This chart illustrates the numbers of companies and the capital vested in all kinds of commercial
companies in Turkey
TOBB, 2013 Aralık Ayına Ait Kurulan ve Kapanan Şirket İstatistikleri Haber Bülteni, 24 Ocak 2014, No.
2013/12, p.1
37 Available at http://risk.gtb.gov.tr/data/52c2bb03487c8e312c013182/T%C3%9CRK%C4%B0YE%
20EKONOM%C4%B0S%C4%B0%20G%C3%96STERGELER%C4%B0_2014_02_13.pdf (accessed
on 13.02.2014).
38 See press release of Hayati Yazici, Minister of Customs and Trade available at http://www.gtb.gov.tr/
haberler/yazici-yeni-turk-ticaret-kanunu-uygulama-sonuclarini-basin-toplantisinda-acikladi (accessed on
13.02.2014).
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According to the statistics, entrepreneurs preferred to establish more limited
liability companies and especially public limited liability companies in Turkey. In
addition, foreign direct investment increased, mostly from EU member states.39
Therefore, the new TCC, especially the new provisions regarding the commercial
companies efficiently affected Turkish markets. Limited liability companies
increase in value. Although the number of limited liability companies is certain
in number, SMCs are not, it can be easily assumed that in the drastic increase in the
number of limited liability companies, the regulation of SMCs as legal entities have
undeniable role.
4 Conclusion
Although the concept of a SMC has been criticized by plenty of lawyers around the
world, it has been accepted by economic actors for a long time and the concept has
now been accepted in many jurisdictions around the world.
With the recognition of SMCs, existing de facto SMCs are legitimized and by
elimination of other possible conflicting shareholders, it is observed that the average
life of these companies will be prolonged. SMCs reduce the information costs so
that some institutions such as universities, societies and foundations are able to
establish a company in order to provide funds to achieve their purpose. SMCs
provide great advantages for entrepreneurs who want to enter the market alone.
Another advantage of commercial companies in general and SMCs in particular, is
the ability to transfer of all company assets in a single legal transaction, which
decreases the transaction costs. In addition, SMCs are the best models for attracting
foreign direct investment. On the other hand, the breach of ‘‘separation of capital of
the company and the management’’ principle and the possibility of asset mix up are
the risks that they bear.
To avoid the misuse of SMCs, some principles should be accepted and regulated
such as separation of assets, the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, prohibition
on loans to the shareholders by companies, and the minimum capital requirements
in legal systems. In some jurisdictions, a system that provides guarantee for the
capital contribution in SMCs is regulated. However, in order to encourage the
formation of SMCs additional conditions that restrain the establishment of SMCs
should not be included in regulations.
As an EU candidate country, Turkey harmonized its TCC in 2012 in accordance
with EU regulations and introduced SMCs for the first time to Turkish commercial
law. All provisions with respect to SMCs are in accordance with Twelfth Directive
of EU; however, provisions regarding publicity and sole shareholder liability could
have been regulated more specifically.
Data and statistics regarding the number of commercial companies established in
2012 and 2013 illustrate that the number of limited liability companies has
39 Available at http://risk.gtb.gov.tr/data/52c2bb03487c8e312c013182/T%C3%9CRK%C4%B0YE%
20EKONOM%C4%B0S%C4%B0%20G%C3%96STERGELER%C4%B0_2014_02_13.pdf (accessed
on 13.02.2014).
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drastically increased and Turkey has become an attractive country for the foreign
direct investment. Therefore, the TCC and provisions regarding SMCs have had an
explicit and positive effect on the Turkish economy.
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161–216.
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Coase, R. H. (1937). The nature of the firm. Economica, 4, 386–405.
Davies, P., & Worthington, S. (2012). Gower’s principles of modern company law. London: Sweet &
Maxwell.
Dural, M. (1998). Tüzel Kişilik Perdesinin Aralanması, SPK 15. Yıl Sempozyumu.
Easterbrook, F. H., & Fischel, D. R. (1996). The economic structure of corporate law. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press.
Edwards, V. (1998). The EU twelfth company law directive. Company Lawyer, 7, 211. et seq.
Eisenhardt, U. (2003). Gesellschaftrecht. Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck.
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